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Abstract
Gait recognition has a broad application in social
security due to its advantages in long-distance hu-
man identification. Despite the high accuracy of
gait recognition systems, their adversarial robust-
ness has not been explored. In this paper, we
demonstrate that the state-of-the-art gait recogni-
tion model is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A
novel temporal sparse adversarial attack under a
new defined distortion measurement is proposed.
GAN-based architecture is employed to semanti-
cally generate adversarial high-quality gait silhou-
ette. By sparsely substituting or inserting a few ad-
versarial gait silhouettes, our proposed method can
achieve a high attack success rate. The impercep-
tibility and the attacking success rate of the adver-
sarial examples are well balanced. Experimental
results show even only one-fortieth frames are at-
tacked, the attack success rate still reaches 76.8%.
1 Introduction
Gait recognition is designed to automatically identify people
according to their way of walking. Compared to traditional
biometric information such as fingerprints or irises, gait can
be obtained at a long distance without the cooperation by sub-
jects. Gait recognition is therefore widely applied in remote
visual surveillance.
In recent years, plenty of gait recognition methods [Wu
et al., 2016; Takemura et al., 2019; He et al., 2019; Wolf
et al., 2016; Liao et al., 2017] have been proposed and
achieved good performance. However, the robustness of gait
recognition algorithms against malicious attacks has not been
thoroughly studied. Very limited work [Jia et al., 2019;
Gafurov et al., 2007; Hadid et al., 2012; Hadid et al., 2015]
has studied the robustness of gait recognition to spoofing at-
tacks, not to mention adversarial attacks which can fool most
machine learning models without causing visual awareness.
Recently, a large amount of studies about adversarial attacks
have been investigated, including attacks on image classifi-
cation [Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015], object
detection [Xie et al., 2017] and face recognition [Sharif et al.,
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Figure 1: Top row: the original examples. Middle row: the
perturbation-based adversarial examples. Bottom row: the temporal
sparse adversarial examples. The red bounding box represents the
modified example, while the green bounding box means the original
example. The middle row directly transfers adversarial attack meth-
ods in image classification to gait recognition, causing all frames
perturbed and imperceptibility decreased. The bottom row has only
the first two frames modified. Besides, the modified frames main-
tain a gait appearance, so it is not easy to distinguish whether they
are adversarial examples or not from human vision.
2016], etc. But for gait recognition, for best of our knowl-
edge, a meaningful attempt has not been found yet.
In this paper, we investigate the security of gait recognition
by adversarial attacking. The main difference between adver-
sarial attacks against gait recognition and other tasks, such as
image classification or face recognition, is the imperceptibil-
ity of adversarial examples. Firstly, the input of gait recog-
nition models is a sequence of silhouette frames, rather than
a single image for image classification models. Furthermore,
to better achieve the imperceptibility of adversarial examples,
only a few frames are allowed to modify. Secondly, natural
images of different categories are easy to distinguish by hu-
mans eyes, whereas the gait silhouette of different subjects
is not that case. Thus motivated by unrestricted adversarial
examples [Brown et al., 2018], crafting an unrestricted ad-
versarial gait silhouette better achieves imperceptibility than
adding a norm-constrained perturbation to the original gait
silhouette. For these two reasons, we propose our temporal
sparse adversarial attack on gait recognition.
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The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first attempt
to adversarial attacks on gait recognition. Experiments
show the vulnerability of gait recognition systems.
• To evaluate the attack intensity properly, we define a new
evaluation criterion by combining the l1 norm in the time
domain and semantic similarity in the spatial domain.
• We propose a novel temporal sparse adversarial attack
method on gait recognition. Our attack achieves a high
attack success rate and good imperceptibility simultane-
ously.
2 Related Work
2.1 Gait Recognition
Gait recognition can generally be grouped into two typical
categories, template-based [Wu et al., 2016; Takemura et al.,
2019; He et al., 2019] and sequence-based [Wolf et al., 2016;
Liao et al., 2017]. The former category is composed of two
main steps: template generation and matching. In the first
step, human silhouettes are compressed into one template
such as GEI [Han and Bhanu, 2006]. In the second step,
the similarities between pairs of templates are evaluated, e.g.,
by the Euclidean distance. The latter category directly cap-
tures better dynamic clues from the sequence of silhouette
frames, including 3D CNN-based approaches [Wolf et al.,
2016], LSTM-based approaches [Liao et al., 2017], and Gait-
Set [Chao et al., 2019]. In all approaches, GaitSet achieves
the state-of-the-art gait recognition results on the CASIA-
B [Yu et al., 2006] datasets.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
Let x ∈ Rm denote an input to a classifier f : Rm →
{1, 2, ..., k}, and assume the attacker has full knowledge of
f . The goal of adversarial attack is to find the correspond-
ing adversarial example x∗ ∈ Rm satisfying ‖x∗ − x‖ ≤ 
but f(x∗) 6= f(x). In this additive perturbation approach,
different norms ‖ · ‖ have been used, such as l1 [Kurakin et
al., 2016], l2 [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015] or l0 [Papernot
et al., 2015]. A series of methods have been proposed such
as the Fast Gradient Sign Method(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al.,
2015], MIFGSM [Dong et al., 2017] and Projected Gradi-
ent Descent(PGD) [Madry et al., 2017]. The adversarial per-
turbations are typically restricted to a small norm. Different
from that, unrestricted adversarial examples [Brown et al.,
2018] are constructed entirely from scratch instead of per-
turbing existing data points by a small amount. There are
some methods [Song et al., 2018; Poursaeed et al., 2019]
focus on generating this special type of adversarial exam-
ples. Poursaeed et al. manipulate stylistic and stochastic la-
tent variables [Poursaeed et al., 2019] which are fed into the
StyleGAN [Karras et al., 2019] to generate an unrestricted
adversarial image misleading a classification model.
We also adopt the GAN-based architecture to generate ad-
versarial high-quality gait silhouette. But, we extend it on
the temporal domain. Instead of perturbing each frame, we
sparsely generate adversarial frames to alert or insert into the
original gait sequence. A temporal mask is employed to con-
trol the sparsity of the adversarial frames. The most related to
our task is the adversarial attack on action recognition [Wei
et al., 2018]. A similar mask-based method is applied to con-
trol the sparsity. Besides, Chen et al.propose a new adversar-
ial attack that appends a few dummy frames to a video clip
and then adds adversarial perturbations only on these new
frames [Chen et al., 2019]. Both the methods focus on the
norm-bounded perturbation and need to tune the hyperparam-
eters in the objective. In our task, we relax the constraint of
perturbations and simplify our objective to omit the tuning.
3 Methodology
3.1 Problem formulation
Let X ∈ RN×W×H×C denote a clean silhouette sequence,
and X∗ ∈ RN×W×H×C denote its adversarial sequence,
where N is the number of frames, W,H,C are the width,
height, and channel for a specific frame, respectively.
The non-targeted adversarial sequence X∗ is the solution
of the following objective function:
arg min
X∗
λC(X,X∗)− Lcos(f(X), f(X∗)) (1)
where λ is a constant to balance the two terms in the objec-
tive. f is a gait recognition model that outputs the computed
features of silhouette sequences. Lcos is the loss function to
measure the cosine similarity between the ground truth se-
quence and the adversarial sequence. C(X,X∗) is a distor-
tion measurement to evaluate the difference between the orig-
inal sequence and its adversarial sequence. For perturbation-
based attack, it is often defined as the lp norm ‖X∗ −X‖p.
For our attack, we define a new measurement as
C(X,X∗) =
∑
n∈Φ
(o(Xn)− o(X∗n))2 (2)
where o is the oracle to decide whether the image is a rea-
sonable gait silhouette and similar to its counterpart. As un-
restricted adversarial examples [Brown et al., 2018], the ad-
versarial frames in our attack are expected to maintain a gait
appearance though may have a large perturbation on pixel-
level. Φ is a subset within the set of frame indices.
3.2 Temporal Sparse Attack
In our new measurement (2), the supervision of the oracle
is of vital importance to improve the imperceptibility in the
spatial domain, but causing the objective Eq.(1) hard to opti-
mize. Thus, we use a well trained generator to craft adversar-
ial frames as [Poursaeed et al., 2019] did. The pipeline of our
attack is shown in Fig. 2.
To control the temporal sparsity, similar to [Wei et
al., 2018], we denote the temporal mask as M ∈
{0,1}N×W×H×C . We let Ω = {1, 2, ..., N} be the set
of frame indices, Φ be a subset within Ω having K ele-
ments randomly sampled from Ω, and Ψ = Ω − Φ. If
n ∈ Φ, we set Mn = 0, and if n ∈ Ψ, Mn = 1, where
Mn ∈ {0,1}W×H×C is the n-th frame in M . Thus the spar-
sity is computed as S = K/N .
𝐺
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Figure 2: The pipeline of our attack approach. The trained generator G is used to generate high-quality gait silhouette image for impercepti-
bility on frame level. The mask M is used to achieve temporal sparsity for imperceptibility on sequence level.
Denote the latent variables inputted into the generator as
Z ∈ RN×V , where V is the dimension of each latent vari-
able. Z is initialized by randomly sampling from the standard
Gaussian distribution. G is a pre-trained generator on a gait
silhouette dataset. Thus the adversarial sequence is obtained
by
X∗ = M ·G(Z) + (1−M) ·X (3)
We name this method as an frame-alteration attack. Instead
of modifying a few frames, an frame-insertion attack inserts
a few frames into the original sequence to obtain the adver-
sarial sequence X∗ ∈ R(N+∆N)×W×H×C .
For the well trained generator G, all the generated images
G(Z) should be classified by the oracle as gait silhouettes,
which means C(X,X∗) = 0. Thus the objective in Eq.(1)
can be simplified as
arg max
Z
Lcos(f(X), f(X∗)) (4)
By performing gradient ascent on Eq.(4) in the latent vari-
able spaces of the generator, the corresponding Z that maxi-
mizes the cosine loss can be found. Without loss of general-
ity, we adopt the MIFGSM [Dong et al., 2017] to attack f as
follows.
g(t+1) = µ · g(t) +
5Z(t)Lcos(f(X), f(X∗(t)))
‖ 5Z(t) Lcos(f(X), f(X∗(t)))‖1
(5)
Z(t+1) = Z(t) +  · sign(g(t+1)) (6)
where µ is the decay factor,  is the step size and t means
the t-th iteration. Algorithm 1 shows the proposed temporal
sparse adversarial attack.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
The dataset we conduct experiments on is CASIA-B [Yu et
al., 2006]. CASIA-B is a widely used gait dataset that con-
tains 124 subjects(labeled 001-124) with 11 different viewing
angles and ten sequences per subject for each view. The 10
sequences contain three walking conditions: 6 sequences are
in the normal walking state(NM 1-6), two sequences contain
walking subject wearing coats(CL 1-2) and two sequences
Algorithm 1 Temporal Sparse Adversarial Attack
Input: A gait recognition model f ; a generator G; a silhouette se-
quenceX; iterations T and decay factor µ; sparsity S; step size

Output: An adversarial silhouette sequenceX∗.
1: g0 = 0;X∗0 =X; Z0 ∼ Gaussian(0, 1).
2: Compute the maskM according to the sparsity S, details are in
the text;
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: InputZt into the generatorG and obtain the imagesG(Zt);
5: Compute the adversarial sequence as X∗t = M ·G(Zt) +
(1−M) ·X;
6: Compute the cosine similarity loss of two sequences features
as Lcos(f(X), f(X∗t ));
7: Update g(t+1) by accumulating the velocity vector in the
gradient direction as Eq.(5);
8: Update Z(t+1) by applying the clipped gradient as Eq.(6);
9: end for
10: returnX∗ = M ·G(ZT ) + (1−M) ·X .
contain subject carrying bags(BG 1-2). The whole dataset
is used to train the WGAN-GP. We use the trained generator
for attack and set the dimension of inputted latent variables
as V = 128.
The threat model is GaitSet, the state-of-the-art gait recog-
nition model. GaitSet regards gait as a set of gait silhouettes
and utilizes the deep neural network to directly extract tempo-
ral information during training. Moreover, GaitSet is flexible
since the input set can contain any number of non-consecutive
silhouettes. Thus for the mask M, we let the set Φ to be
Φ = {1, 2, ...,K}, which means we simply alter the first K
frames with adversarial ones. K is computed according to the
needed sparsity.
Since GaitSet is trained on the first 74 subjects(labeled 1-
74) and tested on the rest 50 subjects, we follow this setting to
attack the last 50 subjects(labeled 75-124). For each subject,
the first 4 sequences of the NM condition (NM 1-4) are kept
in the gallery to test the recognition accuracy. All frames in
a specific view and walking condition are used as a sequence
for the test. Our attack is based on MIFGSM, the hyperpa-
rameters are set as follows: the iterations are 100, µ = 1.0 in
Eq.(5),  = 0.1 in Eq.(6).
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Figure 3: Results of frame-alteration attack. Predefined sparsity includes 1/10, 1/20 and 1/40. Three walking conditions are labeled with
different colors and three settings, Natural(Nat), Random(Ran) and Adversary(Adv) are labeled with different line types.
4.2 Results
The accuracy of GaitSet under our proposed attack is shown
in Fig.3, where the accuracy is averaged on the 11 gallery
views and the identical views are excluded. For example,
the accuracy of the probe view 90◦ is averaged on 10 gallery
views, excluding gallery view 90◦. In (a) we show that our
attacks with different sparsity successfully fool GaitSet, caus-
ing low accuracy in all three walking conditions. More-
over, the attack success rate is positively correlated with spar-
sity, which means that a stronger attack needs more modified
frames in a sequence. Even though, the accuracy drops more
than 68.2% when the sparsity is 1/40.
To further prove the drop performance is caused by our de-
signed attack rather than altering some frames with randomly
chosen gait silhouettes, we compare two situations: (1) Ran-
dom. The latent variable z is randomly sampled from a stan-
dard Gaussian distribution. (2) Adversary. The latent variable
z is obtained by our adversarial attack. As shown in (b)(c)(d),
Random only slightly affects the accuracy of GaitSet, while
Adversary has more severe damage on the recognition perfor-
mance, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our attack.
One intriguing phenomenon is that whether Random or Ad-
versary has a more obvious effect on the accuracy when the
view angle is close to 0◦ or 180◦, which is hardly recogniz-
able. It it still a challenge case for most of the state-of-the-art
gait recognition methods.
We extend the experiments to the frame-insertion at-
tack setting and obtain similar results in Fig.4. We also
perform the perturbation-based attack on each frame with
MIFGSM [Dong et al., 2017] for comparison. The perturba-
tion of each frame is restricted to a Linf norm bound  = 0.1,
with the pixel value within [0,1]. As shown in Fig.1, the per-
turbation is notable, compared with the proposed temporal
sparse adversarial attack.
In the experiments above, our attack obtains a high attack
success rate and good imperceptibility on the silhouette frame
level. Besides the imperceptibility on the temporal dimen-
sion, we also list some adversarial examples crafted by our
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Figure 4: Results of frame-insertion attack. Predefined sparsity includes 1/10, 1/20 and 1/40. Three walking conditions are labeled with
different colors and three settings, Natural(Nat), Random(Ran) and Adversary(Adv) are labeled with different line types.
Figure 5: Top row: the original examples. Middle row: the adver-
sarial examples generated by our attack, which is hard to distinguish
with the original examples from human vision. Bottom row: some
low-quality adversarial examples generated by our attack.
attack in Fig.5 to show the imperceptibility on the spatial di-
mension. However, due to the capacity of the trained gen-
erator, some generated adversarial examples are away from
the normal distribution of gait silhouette. Some low-quality
images are also presented in Fig.5. Even though, most ad-
versarial examples are well generated. Moreover, our attack
achieves high temporal sparsity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel temporal sparse ad-
versarial attack on gait recognition. The new attack achieves
good imperceptibility and a high attack success rate. Exper-
iments on CASIA-B dataset have indicated that the state-of-
the-art model, GaitSet, is vulnerable to our adversarial attack,
showing a great emergency in adversarial robustness research
on gait recognition. We mainly focus on high-quality gait sil-
houettes, instead of RGB gait images, generation for adver-
sarial attacks in this paper. Actually, gait silhouette frames
can be easily transferred to the source video frames with a
generator like the StyleGAN [Karras et al., 2019], which is
left for our future work. It is also easy to transplant our pro-
posed approach to the targeted or black-box attack.
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